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I. BACKGROUND 
“[Public] libraries should be open to all–except the censor.”1 
-John F. Kennedy 
A. The Internet: The New Public Library 
The internet is the center of global communication, culture, 
and education.  As of January 2019, Western Europe is second 
only to North America and Northern Europe in internet 
penetration (a statistic that measures the availability of internet 
in a given geographical place), with data reporting that 94 
percent of Western Europeans have access to the internet.2  The 
same study reported that 50 percent of the global population 
now has internet access, which is a staggering 49.5 percent 
increase from the recorded estimate in 1990 of just half a 
percent.3  From the development of the first computer, to the role 
of Facebook in the Arab Spring,4 and now the mass global social 
media culture, human beings are moving ever more towards life 
on the web.  For those who use it daily, the internet has become 
the epitome of global civilization. 
 
The internet has become the new idea marketplace, in 
which the exchange of ideas, knowledge, values, and cultures 
freely move from source to source.  As such, the internet can be 
a foundation upon which revolutions and world events emanate 
out of, such as the Arab Spring of 2010.  However, inherent in 
                                                          
       1 John F. Kennedy, The Candidates and the Arts, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 29, 
1960, at 44. 
2 J. Clement, Global internet penetration rate as of January 2019, by 
region, STATISTA (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/269329/penetration-rate-of-the-internet-
by-region/. 
3 Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie & Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Internet, OUR 
WORLD DATA (2019), https://ourworldindata.org/internet. 
4 See John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems 
and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 219, 221 (2013) (stating that Arab Spring was “organic movements 
comprised of frustrated citizens demonstrating against their tyrannical 
governments for freedom, greater representation, and economic opportunity.”); 
see generally Jared Malsin & Hassan Morajea, Unrest Rises Again in 
Birthplace of Arab Spring, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/unrest-returns-to-tunisia-birthplace-of-the-arab-
spring-1516789801 (explaining the origins of the Arab Spring as a movement 
for freedom and liberty in the Middle East). 
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this ever-evolving worldwide information source is the risk and 
danger of personal data falling into the hands of criminals, 
and/or the constant threat of private information remaining on 
the internet forever.5  This issue is not relegated to hackers or 
criminals, as large companies like Google and Facebook have 
fallen under fire for their misuse and failure to protect an 
individual’s data.6  Yet, data breaches and misuse are not the 
only dangers associated with the internet.  Unwanted personal 
data can remain on the internet when it is no longer desired, 
creating a “permanent stigmatization”7 of one’s reputation. This 
stigmatization can impact employment hopes and create 
negative impacts in social circles.  A combination of these three 
threats has created the problem of data privacy and the modern 
remedy of the right to be forgotten.8 
B. Solutions for Data Protection 
The roots of data privacy and protection reform in the 
European Union (hereinafter “EU”) can be traced to the 
enactment of Directive 95/46/EC in 1995 (hereinafter 
“Directive”),9 and its successor, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) in 2016.10  The Directive 
stipulated that personal data, i.e. all the information related to 
                                                          
5  See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data 
Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L. J. 115, 115–17 (2017) (noting that there are inherent 
dangers in the exchange of data across the world, particularly in the 
transatlantic trade forum). 
6  See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes 
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018) (stating that “hackers 
also tried to harvest people’s private information, including name, sex and 
hometown, from Facebook’s systems”). 
7  Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to 
Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349, 
353 (2015). 
8  Id. 
9  Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31 [hereinafter The Directive]. 
10  Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. 
(L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
3
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a person that can be used to directly or indirectly identify them,11 
should only be 
 
“collected [only] for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and 
not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”; 
that the processing of data be “adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected”; 
that personal data be maintained accurately and “kept up to date”; 
and that personal data be “kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for 
the purposes for which the data were collected.”12 
 
Included in the Directive was the empowerment of 
individuals to remove or block data which violated the 
prescribed methods of data storage or usage.13  The ability to 
block or remove data later became known as the right to be 
delisted or dereferenced—commonly referred to as the “right to 
be forgotten.”14 
 
However, the year 1995 was hardly the beginning for the 
right to be forgotten.  Data protection was recognized as a means 
of the larger right to privacy, as well as “dignity, personality, and 
self-determination.”15  The foundations of data protection rights 
date back to World War II, when the evils of fascism and the 
ideology of Adolf Hitler impressed upon Europe the need to 
recognize the dignity of human beings and the enumeration of 
liberties.16  This movement created a more established post-war 
identity for Europe in the global arena and led to the enactment 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter “Charter”) 
and the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter 
“Convention”).17  It is important to note however, that the 
                                                          
11  See id. art. 4.  
12  See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, 
the Right to be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE 
L.J. 981, 984–85 (2018) (discussing and citing to The Directive). 
13  Id. at 985. 
14  See generally The Directive, supra note 9 (describing the general 
dereferencing provisions of the right to be forgotten).  
15  Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 5, at 123. 
16  See id. (discussing the origin of Europe’s interest in data protection). 
17  See id. at 124 (noting the roots of the enactment of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
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Charter is interpreted by the EU and by the European Court of 
Justice—the highest court in the EU—while the Convention is 
recognized as international law, and is interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights.18  Thus, the Convention is 
binding only as a body of international law, meaning that it 
interprets the Convention to the extent that it coincides with 
“general principles of the Union’s law.”19  There is no need to fret 
under this scheme of statutory interpretation in light of data 
protection; however, as the right to privacy is a fundamental 
right and “general principles of the Union’s Law;” but the 
presence of two major bodies of law and their respective courts 
of interpretation evidences the great protection that human 
rights and data protection own.20 
 
From the mid-1990s thereon, data protection remained a 
mainstay of the protections afforded to EU citizens.  The right to 
be forgotten, as a remedy for data protection failures, stemmed 
from a recognized ability that every person in everyday 
conversations has: to have their actions forgotten or discarded; 
a new start.21  It is worth noting that there is an inherent risk 
involved when conveying information to a third-party—speaking 
out loud in public, for example—because other third parties will 
share and remember that information.  However, human beings 
possess a capability that does not exist on the internet—the 
ability, rather than surety, to forget information. The ability to 
forget information allows for an opportunity for a fresh start.22 
 
Such is the cognitive capability of human beings to forget, 
which “is useful because it enables humans to adjust and 
reconstruct memories, to generalize, and to construct abstract 
thoughts.”23  The ability to forget enables individuals to achieve 
a fresh start independent from their past actions, which can act 
as a vehicle to maintain dignity and privacy.  With the 
                                                          
18  Id. at 124–25. 
19  Id. at 125 (citing Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, art. 6). 
20  Id.  
21  See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 352 (discussing humans’ 
critical ability to forget). 
22  See id. (discussing selective memory as a way to enable us to shed the 
past and start fresh). 
23  Id. 
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introduction and explosion of the internet and social media, this 
ability has been effectively lost in the flow of history, allowing 
people to recall matters and events that might not have been 
remembered pre-internet.24  In effect, the internet has become a 
“cruel historian,” allowing individuals’ personal information to 
be exposed and shared throughout the world in a matter of 
seconds.25  In this view, the internet and social media dampen 
individual freedoms and makes individuals bound to their 
personal data that finds its way on the internet.26 This argument 
is a major justification for the existence of a broader right to be 
forgotten. 
 
The right to be forgotten faced its first major threat in 2014 
on the precipice of the enactment of the GDPR when a Spanish 
man sought to have his insolvency removed from Google’s search 
listings in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (hereinafter 
“Google Spain”).27  By ruling in favor of Mario Casteja González, 
the European Court of Justice solidified the right to be forgotten 
and propelled the right to an international stage because Google 
could be required to delist or remove information and data from 
their web databases.28  Two years later, in 2016, the EU enacted 
the GDPR, which incorporated a more established right to be 
forgotten and applied those rights to member states.  The GDPR 
allows a number of specific actions to EU citizens whereby: 
 
[p]rivate persons will have the right to delete links to their own 
postings and repostings by third parties. They will have a right to 
delete links to postings created by third parties upon proof that 
the information serves no legitimate purpose other than to 
                                                          
24  See id. (“[T]he Internet is a treasure trove of immutable memories and 
data subjects [which one] must take extraordinary steps in order to forget.”). 
25  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007). 
26  See id. at 17 (arguing that the Internet makes us “less free,” forcing 
people to be victims to data on the internet); see generally Chris Conley, The 
Right To Delete, 2010 AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM: INTELLIGENT INFORMATION 
PRIVACY MANAGEMENT, Mar. 23, 2010, at 53 
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1158/1482 (finding 
that individuals can be bound by their actions that were taken on the internet). 
27  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).  
28  Id.; Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 353–54, 374. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
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embarrass or extort payment from the data subject. Public officials 
and public figures will have a right to remove links to their own 
postings and repostings by third parties, but not postings about 
them by third parties, unless the third party was acting with 
actual malice and the posting does not implicate the public’s right 
to know. In addition, all right to be forgotten requests will be 
subject to a general exemption for the public’s right to know.29 
 
The GDPR ensures that individuals have the ability to 
remove their data from the internet, in order to facilitate the 
rights of individual dignity and privacy.30 
C. Danger of Extraterritorial Expansion 
In 2016, the right to be forgotten encountered the possibility 
of global expansion in Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (hereinafter “Google v. CNIL”), 
where there was a challenge of fines instituted against Google 
for the failure to remove personal data existing outside of the EU 
by the French data protection authority, known as the 
Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés 
(hereinafter “CNIL”).31  The CNIL “requested that Google delist 
search results subject to a successful request for erasure from all 
domains worldwide” and asserted that the EU’s right to be 
forgotten can only be enforced by requiring a data controller like 
Google to remove data beyond the EU’s geographical and 
jurisdictional limits.32  CNIL further argued that “the 
information can still be accessed through other domains or by 
using circumvention methods such as a virtual private network 
                                                          
29  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 354. 
30  See id. at 354, 359 (showing that in Europe there is a right to privacy 
and that the GDPR can be utilized to help promote privacy). 
31  See Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX  LEXIS 
62017CN0507 (Aug. 21, 2017) (requesting that the precedent of the “right to 
de-referencing” be expanded “so that the links at issue no longer appear, 
irrespective of the place from where the search initiated on the basis of the 
requester’s name is conducted, and even if it is conducted from a place outside 
the territorial scope of Directive [95/46/EC] of 24 October 1995[.]”).  
32  Michèle Finck, Google v CNIL: Defining the Territorial Scope of 
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(VPN).”33  Google maintained that such an expansion would 
unjustly swell the jurisdiction of the EU, importing power it 
lacks on subjects around the world, some of which would 
inevitably derive from nations which valued free expression and 
privacy variably.34 
 
The action was brought before the Conseil d’Etat, or the 
Council of State, France, whom in turn stayed the proceedings 
and referred several questions of interpretation to the CJEU.35  
The main question presented was “whether the rules of EU law 
relating to the protection of personal data are to be interpreted 
as meaning that, where a search engine operator grants a 
request for de-referencing, that operator is required to carry out 
that de-referencing on all versions of its search engine.”36  The 
argument on this issue was heard before the CJEU in the 
summer of 2018.37 
 
The expansion of the right to be forgotten raised concerns 
regarding free expression globally; including that inherent 
within dereferencing is the “cannibaliz[ation of] free 
expression[;]” as free thought, free expression, and free speech 
can all be restricted by the removal of information from the 
marketplace.38  It was also widely recognized that the right to be 
forgotten enabled the EU to limit the effectuation of these 
freedoms in exchange for another, the right of privacy, and in 
turn, censor free expression and freedom of the press.39  What’s 
more, was the possibility that the right to be forgotten could 
have been enforced against those not ordinarily subject to the 
EU’s authority. Such enforcement would impose EU ideals in an 
ideological imperialism campaign; resulting in a major impact 
                                                          
33  Id. 
34  Id.  
35  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 112/19, The 
Operator of a Search Engine is not Required to Carry out a De-Referencing on 
all Versions of its Search Engine, (Sept. 24, 2019). 
36  Id. 
37  Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique 
et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 
2019). 
38  See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 354 (discussing removal of 
information and its effects on the freedom of speech, expression, and thought). 
39  Id.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
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on global free expression and speech. 
 
The Advocate General of the EU issued a preliminary 
opinion on January 10, 2019, stating that the right to be 
forgotten can only be enforced within the EU via “geo-
blocking.”40  The Advocate General stated: 
 
[T]here is a danger that the Union will prevent people in third 
countries from accessing information. If an authority within the 
Union could order a global deference, a fatal signal would be sent 
to third countries, which could also order a dereferencing under 
their own laws . . . . There is a real risk of reducing freedom of 
expression to the lowest common denominator across Europe and 
the world.41 
 
The preliminary opinion further stated that the GDPR 
cannot apply to nations outside of the EU, because asserting the 
EU law over other nations poses a risk of ranking one the right 
to privacy as more important than the right to free expression; 
instead, the opinion stated a geo-blocking system should be put 
in place which limits removal of data only in the EU, and not in 
other countries.42  It is important to note that the CJEU was not 
required to follow this preliminary opinion because under EU 
law, the opinions issued by the Advocate General are not binding 
on the court.43 
The CJEU rendered its decision thereafter on September 24, 
2019, holding that the GDPR does not explicitly require data 
                                                          
40  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 2/19, 
Advocate General Szpunar proposes that the Court should limit the scope of 
the de-referencing that search engine operators are required to carry out to the 
EU (Jan. 10, 2019).  
41  Monckton Chambers, Google v CNIL: Advocate General agrees global 
“right to be forgotten” orders pose risk to freedom of expression, MONCKTON 
CHAMBERS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.monckton.com/google-v-cnil-advocate-
general-agrees-global-right-to-be-forgotten-orders-pose-risk-to-freedom-of-
expression/. 
42  See generally Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62017CV0507 (Jan. 10, 2019) (discussing the issues of privacy and the concept 
of geo-blocking).  
43  See Press Release No. 2/19, supra note 40 n.[1] (“It is the role of the 
Advocates General to propose to the Court, in complete independence, a legal 
solution to the cases for which they are responsible.”). 
9
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controllers to execute a dereferencing request on platforms 
without the territorial jurisdiction of the EU.44  In its reasoning, 
the court opined that “the right to the protection of personal data 
is not an absolute right,” and as such, the right to be forgotten 
must be balanced with other fundamental freedoms, such as free 
expression.45  If the right to be forgotten was promulgated 
outside the EU by requiring companies like Google to comport 
with the GDPR in other jurisdictions, then the court held that 
the EU would be infringing on the differing views of other 
nations’ balancing of free expression and privacy.46  Further 
support for this opinion was rooted in provisions within Article 
85 of the GDPR and Article nine of the earlier Directive, which 
permits members states of the EU to enact exemptions from the 
right to be forgotten “for journalistic purposes or for the purpose 
of artistic or literary expression[, but] only if they are necessary 
to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom 
of expression.”47  Given that both the GDPR and the Directive 
delegated such responsibilities to the member states, there is an 
implicit awareness noted in the GDPR regarding the possibility 
that member states value free expression differently, and 
nonetheless other sovereign nations because of their entirely 
different governmental structures and customs.48 
 
Regardless of how victorious this case initially appeared for 
data controllers and search engine operators, the court left open 
the possibility that the right to be forgotten could still be 
enforced globally.49  The court held that while the application of 
the right to be forgotten is not required to be enforced without 
the jurisdictional confines of the EU, such an application 
remains permissive if after both the privacy interests of the data 
subject and free expression are given proper consideration, the 
                                                          
44  Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l’informatique 
et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 
2019).   
45  Id. ¶ 60. 
46  Id.  
47  Id. ¶ 7 (quoting The Directive, supra note 9 art. 9).  
48  See id. ¶ 27 (quoting GDPR, supra note 10 art. 85). 
49  See id. ¶ 73 (stating that a search engine operator granting request to 
de-referencing “is not required to carry out that de-referencing on all versions 
of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corresponding to 
all the Member States”).  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
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interest of privacy is best served.50  Therefore, what was thought 
to be defined in Google v. CNIL, the territorial confines of the 
right to be forgotten, remains unanswered and the 
implementation of such right can still occur throughout the 
world, leaving the legal basis for doing so unexplained.51 
 
In light of the instability provided by the CJEU’s decision in 
Google v. CNIL, this article will provide further insight into the 
relationship between the right to be forgotten and free 
expression that can continue to exist when applied globally.  
Moreover, this article pursues an exposition on the negative 
implications that a right to be forgotten may proffer on global 
freedom of expression. 
II. RESTRICTING FREEDOM BY FORGETTING 
A. Google Spain v. AEPD: The Prevailing Rule 
The main motivation behind the drafting and eventual 
enactment of the Directive was to protect individual human 
rights through the enactment of privacy laws which limited the 
scope and use of private information.52  Such motivation 
stemmed from the post-war period of European history and led 
to the enactment of the first privacy statute in Germany on 
September 30, 1970.53  This led to the enactment of privacy 
statutes in Sweden in 1973, and Austria, Denmark, and Norway 
in 1978.54  There was widespread consensus that the policies 
made during this period would be centered around “Fair 
Information Practices” in the global exchange of information, 
                                                          
50  Adam Satariano, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Privacy Rule Is Limited by 
Europe’s Top Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/technology/europe-google-right-to-be-
forgotten.html. 
51  Dan Shefet, Extraterritoriality, the internet and the right to be 
forgotten, ABA J. (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:52 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/voice/article/extraterritoriality-and-the-internet 
(noting that the EUCJ “did not follow the advocate general’s Jan. 10, 2019, 
recommendation entirely” and in doing so “the court wished to promulgate that 
as a general principle extraterritoriality was not unlawful.”). 
52  Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to 
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971–72 (2013). 
53  Id. at 1969. 
54  Id.  
11
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agreed upon by Western Europe and the United States 
(hereinafter “U.S.”).55  Two additional privacy policies also went 
into effect during this period: the “Privacy Guidelines of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereinafter “OECD”) and the Convention on Privacy of the 
Council of Europe.”56  The Convention on Privacy of the Council 
of Europe was the first Europe-wide agreement which 
established harmonious privacy policies and provided the 
foundation for the Directive’s enactment in 1995.57 
 
The Directive provided regulations and conditions for 
companies attempting to store or use personal data, including 
consent and a duty to protect such data.58  The Directive had two 
main goals: “to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the 
EU” and “to ensure an equally high level of protection within all 
countries in the EU for ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy.’”59  As 
mentioned above, this Directive included the right to be 
forgotten, or to have personal data delisted from those 
companies or servicers storing personal data, which was viewed 
as a proper means to effectuate data privacy.60  In addition to 
this remedy, “data subjects,” which are those who have data 
located online, also “have the right to obtain copies of 
information collected and the right to correct or delete personal 
data.”61  Companies or data controllers would then be held liable 
for holding such data against the wishes of the “data subject,” 
facing fines for non-compliance.62 
 
 
In 2014, the right to be forgotten intersected with free 
expression in Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (hereinafter “Google Spain v. AEPD”).  Mario Costeja 
González, a Spanish citizen, sought to remove newspaper 
                                                          
55  Id.  
56  Id.  
57  Id. at 1970.  
58  Schwartz, supra note 52, at 1972. 
59  Id.  
60  Id. 
61  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 361. 
62  Id.  
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articles regarding the auction of his home following his financial 
difficulties.63  González petitioned the newspaper publisher to 
remove the articles and for Google to remove the search listings 
for these articles, his reasoning was that the articles were an 
invasion into his privacy because they harmed his reputation 
and were no longer relevant.64  The newspaper refused to remove 
the articles, stating that the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs had required them to be published in the first place, and 
Google refused to remove the links on the basis that search 
listings are considered free expression, and should not be 
removed.65  The AEPD relied on the Directive’s requirement of 
“data controllers” to remove information that was “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive,”66 and ordered 
Google to remove the search listings that led users to the articles 
concerning González.67 
 
Google then appealed the order and brought this case before 
the National High Court of Spain, who in turn referred the 
matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).68  
The applicability of the Directive became a major dispute upon 
appeal as Google tried to argue that as a search engine, they 
merely provided data online, and as a result could not be 
considered a “data controller.”69  The CJEU denied this 
argument and ruled that Google was indexing data online which 
provided data to its users, placing the company into the category 
of “data controllers;” and as such, the Directive applied.70  In this 
landmark ruling, the CJEU created precedent which establishes 
a broad right to have information delisted, thereby requiring 
positive government intervention to protect such right for 
                                                          
63  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014). 
64  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 363–64. 
65  Id.  
66  Catherine Baksi, Right to be forgotten ‘must go’, Lords committee says, 
GAZETTE (July 30, 2014), http://directories.lawgazette.co.uk/law/right-to-be-
forgotten-must-go-lords-committee-says/5042439.article. 
67  Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, GLOBAL. 
FREEDOM EXPRESSION (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google-spain-sl-v-
agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-aepd/. 
68  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 364. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
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information that an individual shows to be “inadequate, 
irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive.”71  In effect, this 
precedent restricts free expression by allowing individuals to 
alter the availability of information on the Internet, which 
censors the original creator and prevents the free flow of 
information.72  The GDPR as enacted in 2018, further 
strengthens this precedent by expanding its reach to all source 
websites and data controllers, regardless of whether or not they 
are located within the EU.73 
 
The GDPR and the right to be forgotten therein was geared 
to fulfill the following three concepts: “(1) the right to have 
information deleted after a preset period; (2) the right to have a 
clean slate; and (3) the right to be connected to current 
information and delinked from outdated . . . .”74  The procedure 
for exercising this right is as follows: the data subject may have 
information removed that is no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which it was collected or otherwise processed, 
where data subjects have withdrawn their consent for 
processing or where they object to the processing of personal 
data concerning them or where the processing of their personal 
data otherwise does not comply with this Regulation.75 
 
Under the GDPR, the data controller bears the burden in 
these situations to consider and adjudicate the issue of the 
existence of the above factors.76  This poses an inherent burden 
on data controllers being that they must process and make a 
determination on each request, which can detract from business 
operations or even significantly harm a smaller business.77  
Additionally, it is worth noting that the information need not be 
                                                          
71  Baksi, supra note 66. 
72  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 365. 
73  GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.  
74  Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 367; see Bert-Jaap Koops, 
Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right to 
be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 232–33 (2011) (noting that 
the right to be forgotten can be conceptualized in the same three manners).  
75  GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
76  Id. 
77  See Baksi, supra note 66 (noting Google’s European sites already 
dealing with over 70,000 data removal requests, and smaller companies’ 
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even prejudicial to the data subject; the data must only fall 
within the threshold of “no longer relevant” or the two other 
enumerated justifications.78 
 
To address the free expression confliction that Google Spain 
v. AEPD posed, the GDPR included statutory exemptions for: 
 
(a) . . . exercising the right of freedom of expression in accordance 
with Article 80; (b) for reasons of public interest in the area of 
public health in accordance with Article 81; (c) for historical, 
statistical and scientific research purposes in accordance with 
Article 83; (d) for compliance with a legal obligation to retain the 
personal data by Union or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject; Member State laws shall meet an objective of 
public interest, respect the essence of the right to the protection of 
personal data and be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.79 
 
At first glance this may seem to rectify concerns posed by 
critics; however, upon closer look, the articles referenced and 
other EU law do not provide a “bright line standard,” which 
leaves data controllers to subjectively determine what is and 
what is not freedom of expression.80  In order to assist in 
deciphering what constitutes “expression” pursuant to the above 
exemptions as to adequately process a request to remove or 
delist information from the internet, Google has formed an 
advisory council which lacks any sort of transparency or public 
exposure as to their methodology for approaching such 
requests.81 This fact illustrates the larger issue within the 
promulgation of the right to be forgotten; in allowing data 
controllers to make a determination as to what constitutes “free 
                                                          
78  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014). 
79  Id.  
80  See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 7, at 371–72 (noting that free 
expression in the EU is a qualified right, that cedes to national security, 
defamation, crime prevention, protection of health and morals, confidential 
information and the impartiality of the judiciary). 
81  Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google determined our right to 
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expression” within a given request without any transparency, 
free expression itself is thereby diluted and left without a clear 
precedent to abide by.82  Data controllers and their advisory 
councils are thereby left to make a subjective determination of 
what constitutes free expression in that situation. To this point, 
there have been numerous accounts of newspaper articles, news 
reports, and other public documents that can be considered to be 
the free expression of the author, which have been delisted 
through this process.83 
 
It is also said that free expression in the EU is weaker than 
its American counterpart,84 which is protected against vague 
and overbroad restrictions, while free expression in the EU is 
not.85  There is great ambiguity in what free expression is and 
what it is not in the EU. This ambiguity can lead to varying 
results and an overall lack of protection for this fundamental 
right.  Thus, a large threat exists in the implementation of the 
right to be forgotten given the broad authority it promulgates, 
or in other words, the original intention of the Right, which was 
to remove unwanted personal data, now extends to censorship.  
As Robert G. Larson states, “[s]uch imprecision when delimiting 
the bounds of permissible speech invites overzealous 
censorship[—]by the data subject as well as by third parties and 
Web sites that host user content[—]has long been known to have 
a chilling effect on speech . . . .”86 
                                                          
82  See David Mitchell, The right to be forgotten will turn the internet into 
a work of fiction, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2014, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/06/right-to-be-forgotten-
internet-work-of-fiction-david-mitchell-eu-google (arguing that comments or 
actions made on the internet are never forgotten). 
83  See id. (listing examples of articles or documents that have been 
delisted). 
84  Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-
Based Privacy and a Right to be Forgotten are Incompatible with Free Speech, 
18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 107 (2013). 
85  See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 
569, 574–75 (1987) (finding a resolution that restricts First Amendment 
activities unconstitutional “because no conceivable governmental interest 
would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech.”). 
86  Larson III, supra note 84, at 108. 
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B.  Google v. CNIL: The Ironic Anticlimax 
Google Spain v. AEPD gave birth to a paradox of privacy 
and free expression, forcing corporations and other online 
entities to remove information from the internet and the digital 
public market.87  International corporations categorized as data 
controllers, like Google, thereafter faced thousands if not 
hundreds of thousands of requests to delist or remove 
information.88  Given the massive quantity of these requests, 
corporations became inundated with those asking to remove 
information from their websites, and when these corporations 
failed to remove the information, they faced great fines.89  Since 
2014, Google has received over 3.3 million requests and has 
granted approximately 45 percent of these requests, some of 
which were located on websites and domains90 outside of the 
EU’s territorial reach.91 
 
Of the requests that Google satisfied, it did not remove all 
information or listings located on domains in the U.S., or those 
outside the EU.92  The French data protection agency, the 
Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés or the 
“CNIL,” believed that Google’s actions were in direct 
contravention of the Directive and instituted significant fines.93  
                                                          
87  See Alan Travis & Charles Arthur, EU court backs ‘right to be 
forgotten’: Google must amend results on request, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 9:06 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-
forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results (discussing the European court 
decision backing the “right to be forgotten”); Mitchell, supra note 82 
(explaining the ruling in Google Spain v. AEPD). 
88  James Doubek, Google Has Received 650,000 ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ 
Requests Since 2014, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/28/589411543/google-
received-650-000-right-to-be-forgotten-requests-since-2014. 
89  See Finck, supra note 32 (discussing the effects of the holding in Google 
LLC v. CNIL).  
90  See P. Christensson, Domain Name Definition, TECHTERMS, (Sept. 14, 
2012), https://techterms.com/definition/domain_name (explaining that a 
domain is the unique name which identifies a website and can have a country 
code associated with it to identify the location the domain is registered in).  
91  Finck, supra note 32; Satariano, supra note 50. 
92  Finck, supra note 32. 
93  See Tony Romm, France fines Google nearly $57 million for first major 
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The CNIL brought suit against Google, believing that the only 
way to give full effect to the right to be forgotten was to extend 
its reach to domains found outside the EU.94  Google disagreed 
and contended that to extend authority outside the EU would 
unjustly expand the EU’s governmental powers, contravening 
the local law of that sovereign.95 
 
The case was referred to the CJEU, known as Google LLC 
v. CNIL, and was thought of as the case to determine the 
territorial scope of the right to be forgotten.96  Google’s position 
aptly illustrates the dangers of a global expansion of the EU’s 
privacy laws, which is that of an act of “data imperialism” and a 
violation of free expression.97  Data imperialism is the theory 
that by placing the implication of the EU’s data ethics in the 
hands of corporations abroad, the EU seeks to impart its own 
values on other countries in the world.98  Inherent in this right 
to be forgotten legal scheme is the danger that other countries 
do not share the same value of privacy that the EU has 
enumerated, which presents a conflict for both the citizens and 
government of that country.99  Professor Cedric Ryngaert—a 
professor of public international law—has noted that such 
conflict can then “strike a different balance between data 
protection and other societal imperatives,” which casts doubt on 
                                                          
regime/2019/01/21/89e7ee08-1d8f-11e9-a759-
2b8541bbbe20_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.623fc9fa52cc (French 
regulators fined Google for “violating Europe’s tough new data-privacy rules”); 
see also Mark Scott, Google Fined by French Privacy Regulator, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/technology/google-fined-
by-french-privacy-regulator.html (Google “was fined $112,000 . . . by France’s 
data protection watchdog for failing to comply with demands to extend a 
European privacy ruling across its global domains”). 
94  See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019) (focusing on the regulation to Member States). 
95  Finck, supra note 32. 
96  See Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019); Finck, supra note 31. 
97  Finck, supra note 32. 
98  See Cedric Ryngaert, Symposium Issue on Extraterritoriality and EU 
Data Protection, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 221, 224 (2015) (discussing the 
difference between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
99  Id. at 223. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
2020 Forgetting the Right to be Forgotten 333 
relations with other countries and civil relationships.100  It is 
difficult to imagine a situation for example, where an order by 
the CNIL to remove information from the internet would 
likewise be valid under applicable U.S. law.  Public information 
is well protected in the U.S. under the First Amendment and 
free speech restrictions are constitutionally protected for 
overbreadth, which may apply to an otherwise broad right to be 
forgotten.101 
 
In its September 24, 2019 decision, the CJEU held that 
under the GDPR, the right to be forgotten is not required to be 
enforced globally.102  It reasoned that no-where in the text of the 
Article 17(1) of the GDPR is an explicit requirement that data 
controllers be mandated to remove any information that is 
subject to removal under the provisions therein, regardless of 
location.103  The CJEU acknowledged that there was validity to 
CNIL’s position that the only manner in which to completely 
effectuate the legislative intent of providing for the ultimate 
privacy of EU subjects is to remove information, wherever it may 
exist.104  The court explicitly stated that although the statement 
was true and would meet the goal of ensuring privacy in full, to 
affirm this point would unjustly favor privacy and inure great 
prejudice to objects of free expression, including free access to 
information and freedom of the press.105  Therefore, the court 
held that when considering a request to remove information, 
member states are required to evaluate the free expression 
considerations within the then current facts, but are not bound 
by the GDPR to mandate that the data be removed globally.106 
 
Paragraph 72 of the decision, however, further muddied the 
                                                          
100  Id. at 225.  
101  See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 
569, 575 (finding a resolution that restricts First Amendment activities 
unconstitutional “because no conceivable governmental interest would justify 
such an absolute prohibition of speech.”). 
102  See generally Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Commission nationale de 
l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019). 
103  Id. ¶¶ 3, 65. 
104  Id. ¶ 55. 
105  Id. ¶ 60.   
106  Id. ¶ 72.  
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future of the extent of the right to be forgotten, which stated 
“[l]astly, it should be emphasised that, while, as noted in 
paragraph 64 above, EU law does not currently require that the 
de-referencing granted concern all versions of the search engine 
in question, it also does not prohibit such a practice.”107  The 
court failed to offer a legal basis or pathway for the execution of 
such practice and instead referred the implementation thereof 
to the member states.108  Thus, territorial boundaries of the right 
to be forgotten are far from defined. 
C. Current Framework 
As a precursor to data removal, the data subject must 
establish that the information is private, and then it is the 
obligation of the data controller to either remove the information 
or refuse to do so.109  The CJEU held in Google Spain that an 
individual would be able to request that search engines or those 
who engage in the “processing of data”110 remove links with 
personal information, pursuant to the Directive and now 
current, GDPR.  Generally, only those considered to be a data 
controller within the meaning of Article 4 of the GDPR could be 
mandated to remove requested information.111  Generally, a 
controller is defined as a company which “determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”112 
 
Google Spain added a crucial implication to the application 
of the right to be forgotten in holding that search engine 
operators (hereinafter “SEOs”) are controllers within the 
meaning of Article 4 of the GDPR.113  It was previously 
established that data controllers, those who possess and store 
data, had differing responsibilities and duties under the GDPR 
than data “processors,” who merely provide access to 
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108  Satariano, supra note 50.  
109  Case C-507/17, (Sept. 24, 2019), ¶ 16.  
110  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
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information and data; data “controllers” were subject to the 
dereferencing obligations of the right to be forgotten, whereas 
the data processors were not.114  In this respect, SEOs were 
thought of as data processors, given that they merely provided 
access to websites and databases via links.115  Google Spain held 
otherwise for reasons stated hereinabove and mandated that 
SEOs comply with the dereferencing obligations within the then 
current Directive, as replaced by the GDPR.116 
 
Data which is subject to the dereferencing protections of the 
right to be forgotten includes that which is inaccurate, 
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.117  Google Spain held that 
if an individual asserts that information found online falls into 
any of the above categories, such persons can request that their 
information be removed, thus forcing the data controller to 
remove such information or allowing the individual to bring a 
lawsuit.118  If a lawsuit is brought alleging enforcement of the 
GDPR, then the data provider has the burden to show that the 
data subject’s information should not be removed.119 The court 
will make its determination on a case by case basis. 
 
This process also applies in other jurisdictions under the 
CJEU holding that stated that “even if the physical server of a 
company processing data is located outside Europe, EU rules 
apply to search engine operators if they have a branch or a 
subsidiary in a Member State”.120  In Google Spain, the CJEU 
opined that given the global nature of search engines and data 
providers, the only way to effectuate the EU’s interest in 
protecting the fundamental human right to privacy is to hold 
these entities accountable extrajudicially.121  The CJEU further 
                                                          
114  Keller, supra note 111, at 307. 
115  Id. at 311. 
116  Case C-131/12, (May 13, 2014), ¶ 6.  
117  Id. at ¶ 92. 
118  Id. at ¶ 94. 
119  EUROPEAN COMM’N, Factsheet on the “Right to Be Forgotten” Ruling 
(C-131/12) 1, 3 (2018), 
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120  OFFICIAL (ISC) GUIDE TO THE CISSP CBK 220 (Adam Gordon 4th ed. 
2015). 
121  Case C-131/12, (May 13, 2014), ¶ 3. 
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dictated that “[s]earch engines are controllers of personal data[, 
and therefore,] Google can . . . not escape its responsibilities 
before European law when handling personal data by saying it 
is a search engine.”122  Under Google Spain, EU jurisdiction 
extends to wherever a citizen of the EU has data he or she wants 
to be removed or dereferenced.123  As noted herein, this 
extraterritorial aspect of the right to be forgotten still exists 
under Google LLC v. CNIL.  The only clarification that Google 
LLC v. CNIL provided was that the member states are required 
to consider the effect on free expression around the world when 
determining the application of the right to be forgotten.124  It is 
also important to note that the CJEU left open the possibility 
that the right to be forgotten could be applied globally without 
delineating a specific legal basis for doing so.125  Therefore, 
Google Spain remains binding precedent and its shockwaves 
continue to permeate the promulgation of the right to be 
forgotten onto other nations. 
D. Global Outlook 
Therefore, there remains two major issues that can cause a 
loss of liberties on the part of citizens and countries around the 
world, as the possibility remains that the right to be forgotten 
can be applied on other nations.  First, being that the right to be 
forgotten creates a hindrance on the availability and free flow of 
information across the world, freedom of expression can be 
weakened.126  Such implementation can also censor news outlets 
and limit free press,127 resulting in a global exhibition of Plato’s 
allegory of the cave; a situation in which individuals are only as 
informed to the extent of the information that they are exposed 
to.128  Second, the territorial reach can negatively impact 
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interactions amongst nations and deprive individuals of 
differing freedoms extended to them by their respective counties, 
such as the U.S., a place in which the right to be forgotten would 
be inconsistent with its constitution.129  If the right to be 
forgotten is not sufficiently tailored to fit the needs of free 
expression, movements like the Arab Spring and the free flow of 
information will be significantly dampened. 
III. IMPACTS OF A GLOBAL RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
A. Free Access to Information: The Arab Spring and Social 
Media Hosts 
A major unanswered question of interpretation is whether 
social media platforms, also known as “hosts,” such as Facebook 
and Twitter can be held to be data controllers. If so, they would 
be subject to the right to be forgotten.130  Applying the definition 
of data controllers as those entities that determine the purpose 
and means of processing personal data, critics have reasoned 
that hosts cannot be found to be data controllers because they 
merely provide access to information that is very often published 
by the author who themselves possess the right to post or remove 
such data.131  If hosts are held to be data controllers, there is no 
telling what their obligations may be under the right to be 
forgotten.132  Hosts could be forced to remove a post entirely or 
delist the post from its own search results on its website.133  With 
regard to the possibility that hosts could be required to comport 
with the right to be forgotten, there is a risk that a user’s free 
expression could be severely hindered, thereby reducing the 
availability and free access to information around the world. 
 
As it currently exists, the GDPR provides an exception to 
the right to be forgotten for freedom of expression and 
information that would be publicly available.134  However, as 
                                                          
129  John W. Dowdell, An American Right to be Forgotten, 52 TULSA L. REV. 
311, 322, 332 (2017). 
130  Keller, supra note 111, at 334–49. 
131  Id. at 322. 
132  Id. at 325. 
133  See id. at 326 (discussing the implications of the European Union’s 
landmark decision in Google Spain).   
134  GDPR, supra note 10, art. 17.  
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noted above, this exception is seen as illusory by critics, as the 
exception fails to provide a standard for interpretation to be used 
by the companies processing requests under the GDPR.135  The 
reasoning behind this position is that if one lacks the proper 
parameters to form a decision, that decision is vulnerable to 
mistakes, impreciseness, and integrity.136  Those who decide 
what information becomes delisted or not also decide larger 
questions of what is to be considered free expression.137  It is no 
secret that social media posts constitute a great number of 
requests involved in the right to be forgotten. Many young adults 
seek to remove embarrassing personal content from Facebook 
which left online would be damaging to their reputation.138  On 
one hand, deleting or delisting one’s personal content can be 
viewed as an act in furtherance of data protection, but given that 
there remains the possibility that social media platforms could 
incur dereferencing obligations under the right to be forgotten, 
a broad right to remove other individual’s post that contains a 
requesting data subject’s information on social media can cause 
a reduction in the availability of information to people around 
the world.139  The most serious result could be the silencing of 
cries for democracy and freedom from oppression.140 
 
The Arab Spring—a period of time in which the Middle East 
saw rapid governmental and social change—is illustrative of the 
role that social media and the internet as a whole has in relation 
to the free flow of, and access to, information.141  Facebook 
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specifically became a platform for participants to share their 
experiences which were then spread across the world.142  The 
Arab Spring began in 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi’s produce 
stand was seized by the Tunisian government after he refused 
to pay officials bribes.143  Bouazizi then poured paint thinner on 
his body and set himself on fire, protesting the harsh Tunisian 
regime.144  In Egypt, a short time earlier, the killing of Khaled 
Said went viral across social media platforms, after police had 
beat him to death over evidence he had obtained of police 
corruption.145  These events sparked many other protests, which 
were then filmed or photographed and shared all over social 
media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.146  
Individuals across the Middle East viewed common experiences 
on social media, increasing the awareness of the harsh realities 
of oppressive governments.147  One eyewitness stated, “[w]e were 
online every day . . . and on the streets pretty much every day, 
collecting information, collecting videos, organizing protests, 
[and] getting into protests[,]” calling Facebook “the GPS for this 
revolution.”148  Protests spread to Egypt, Libya, and Syria, 
causing these governments to try to censor the protests on social 
media by cutting off internet access to their citizens.149 Although 
these protests were not as successful in ending oppressive 
regimes, they did end in the overthrow of Muammar Al Qaddafi 
in Libya150 an improvement for human rights in Tunisia.151  
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WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/arabspring/. 
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overthrow-of-muammar-gaddafi/. 
151  See generally The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Dec. 17, 2011, 6:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-
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Social media facilitated the spread of information, albeit 
eyewitness accounts, and played “a vital role in the Arab 
Spring[‘s]” existence.152 
 
Should hosts be required to comport with the right to be 
forgotten, the removal or delisting of information on social media 
platforms could prevent events like the Arab Spring from 
happening in the future either in the EU or abroad.  The posts 
by protestors on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube regarding the 
Arab Spring could have been removed or delisted had a social 
media post contained information regarding an EU citizen under 
the current scheme enacted by the GDPR and the recent decision 
in Google v. CNIL.153  Paragraph 72 of that decision left open the 
possibility that the right to be forgotten could apply globally, if 
after a consideration of free expression and privacy effects, such 
global application was necessary to fulfill the legislative 
objective of data protection and privacy.154  Thereafter, an EU 
citizen would need only show that the post or information 
concerning them was “inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in 
relation to the purposes of the processing . . . .155  In effect, the 
right to be forgotten could “rewrite history,” altering the ability 
of free information to flow from one individual to the next by 
allowing an individual to remove even the most trivial of 
information from the internet.156 
The importance of the free exchange of ideas and 
information is grounded in the theories of self-fulfillment and 
marketplace of ideas—that individuals are in a better position 
to understand what is best for them when they have unlimited 
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156  See Larson, supra note 84, at 119 (discussing how the creation of a 
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access to information to aid in formulating opinions and ideas.157  
One fundamental principle of the self-fulfillment theory states 
that “the purpose of society . . .  is to promote the welfare of the 
individual . . . [and] that every individual is entitled to equal 
opportunity to share in decisions which affect him.”158  “[T]he 
marketplace of ideas theory holds that unencumbered free 
speech is a public good because it enables members of society to 
evaluate and compare their ideas, beliefs, and assumptions.”159  
Under this theory, democratic participation is also achieved, as 
those engaged in the uprisings in the Arab Spring had utilized 
information on social media to form the basis of their 
movements.160 
 
Thus, in removing or delisting information from the 
internet, individuals are denied the full ability to better their 
minds and standing in the world, the opposite of which occurred 
during the Arab Spring.161  Protestors collected information on 
social media concerning protests in other areas, which allowed 
them to formulate a plan and organize the protests.162  
Therefore, it is axiomatic that providing a means of removing or 
delisting such information to EU citizens can hinder such events 
from occurring in the EU. However, this risk could be 
exacerbated under Google v. CNIL as data can be required to be 
removed in another country.163 
 
Consider two hypothetical situations which could result in 
the hindrance of free access to information in the aftermath of 
Google v. CNIL.  Joe, an EU citizen, requested that a news 
article164 regarding a protest against the Tunisian government 
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that he had participated in years ago be delisted or dereferenced 
from its listing on Facebook.  The article can also be found in 
Tunisia and Joe has met the requirements to have the 
information dereferenced.  The news outlet then removes the 
article and the information therein is now so less accessible that 
it is essentially rendered deleted.165  Consider a simpler 
situation in which a citizen of Country X, a member state of the 
EU, participates in a protest and posts criticisms of past actions 
of the current leader on Facebook.  The leader, also a citizen of 
Country X, requests that the post or data be removed from 
Facebook.166  If Facebook removes or delists said post, 
information in the user’s post is withdrawn from the market and 
the experiences shared therein become irrelevant.  Both 
hypotheticals illustrate how the availability of information to 
individuals can be limited by the right to be forgotten, a 
situation which stands in direct contradiction to two theories of 
free expression: the self-fulfillment theory and the marketplace 
of ideas theory.167  This danger has intensified in the aftermath 
of Google v. CNIL, as the reduction of information from the 
market can take place on a global level.168 
B.  Free Speech by a Free Press: A Chilling Effect 
American news programs, such as the Washington Post, 
have reported on various privacy concerns including instances 
in which conversations that are recorded by Amazon’s Alexa 
have potentially been used to aid prosecutors in a murder 
investigation in the U.S.169 These news programs have also 
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reported on the 2018 Facebook data breach that left the personal 
information of 29 million people worldwide in the hands of 
computer hackers.170  These ongoing reports issued by various 
media outlets on growing privacy have become commonplace.  
Yet, in an ironic turn, one of the major effects of the enforcement 
of the right to be forgotten has been the censoring of news outlets 
on a global level who report information about individuals, and 
therefore can become subject to dereferencing obligations.171  
Protecting the freedom of the press was intended to be a 
mainstay of the GDPR, including enacting exceptions172 for 
public information that is “necessary for reasons of substantial 
public interest . . . .”173  However, news articles have been 
removed about individuals and media outlets in Europe have 
experienced removal of their content online. It is important to 
note that public court documents are not immune from the reach 
of the right to be forgotten.174 
 
The general consensus for critics against the right to be 
forgotten is that acts of dereferencing conflicts with free speech 
by censoring news outlets and free press and thus hinders the 
ability of media outlets to provide information to individuals.175  
This criticism is not to specifically categorize the idea of a free 
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press as inferior to the press’ free speech rights, but to illustrate 
the interplay of those freedoms that contribute to the larger 
umbrella of free expression.176  Critics that support greater free 
speech rights maintain that by providing means to remove 
information from the internet, individuals censor organizations 
and other individuals that expressed that information.177  Critics 
that support greater free press rights argue that media outlets’ 
ability to report news is severely hindered when articles and 
similar postings can be removed from the internet.178  It is the 
free speech rights of a press that facilitates the ability of media 
outlets to practice their function as a free press by providing 
information to the masses, and removing that right creates a 
major concern for media outlets around the world.179 
 
In the face of a threat to free access of information through 
media outlets and internet sources, the CJEA took action.180  The 
CJEU held in Google Spain that the right to be forgotten is not 
absolute, which was solidified in the public information 
exception of the GDPR; however, it intended the ruling to be 
more narrowly drawn in consideration of other rights they 
considered to be fundamental to garner attention.181  In doing so, 
the court recognized that the right to be forgotten places a great 
deal of power in the hands of data subjects and controllers alike 
by allowing individuals to remove information that may be 
considered to be in the public domain.182  The motivation for such 
an exception may be compelling and in line with the original 
aspirations of the 1950 Convention.183  The Convention’s goals 
                                                          
176  Id.  
177  Statement on The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at ¶ 
4, Case C-507/17, Google, LLC. v. Comm’n nationale de l’informatique et des 
libertés (CNIL), https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/2017-11-29-Googe-v-
CNIL.pdf [hereinafter RCFP Statement]. 
178  Oghia, supra, note 171. 
179  See RCFP Statement, supra note 177 (discussing how free speech 
rights in the context of free press is worrisome).  
180  See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEDP), 2014 CURIA (May 13, 2014) (discussing how the 
court balanced individual interests and public interests). 
181  Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 88, 90–92 
(2012). 
182  See Cox, supra note 174 (discussing the Bujaldon case in an effort to 
exemplify removal of information from the public domain). 
183  European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9, opened for signature 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss2/3
2020 Forgetting the Right to be Forgotten 345 
were to protect privacy interests as well as solidify other 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech and 
expression.  While enforcing a right to be forgotten can further 
these goals, it can be seen as favoring the right to privacy as 
opposed to free expression as more significant in allowing public 
information to be removed as it currently is.184  This is due to the 
fact that the free expression exception is left to the 
interpretation and guidance of the member states, which can be 
imprecise and may conflict with other nations’ valuation of both 
free speech and free press.185  Allowing for member states to 
consider free expression on a case by case basis creates a chilling 
effect on the same.186 
 
A true free press allows for the widespread flow of 
information to individuals.187  The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter “UNESCO”) 
stated, “Freedom of Information and Freedom of Expression 
work against the concentration of information within the hands 
of a few.  Of course, all information is subject to interpretation.  
For this reason, the clearinghouse function of an open and 
pluralistic media sector is critical to a better understanding of 
any issue”.188 
However, in the enforcement of the right to be forgotten, 
newspapers, magazines, and a broad variety of information 
sources are forced to delist information from public access.189 At 
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the very center of Google Spain was the request for the removal 
of information regarding González in various newspaper 
articles.190  The right to be forgotten leaves any source that 
publishes an EU citizen’s information on the internet vulnerable 
to be ordered to delist that information.  This creates a broad 
application of a right which has been deemed a “foundation of 
justice and peace in the world”.191  Therefore, it is difficult to 
sever the relationship that the enforcement and promulgation of 
the right to be forgotten has with free speech and free press.  The 
newspaper that published the information containing 
González’s likeness was exercising the same freedom that would 
be afforded to any other individual that speaks of another person 
in conversation.  This is the precis argument of news outlets and 
the RCFP that contend that the right restricts media outlet’s 
efficacy and ability to reach their audiences because it 
materially weakens free speech.192 
 
The RCFP is a U.S. based organization with a mission “to 
keep government accountable by ensuring access to public 
records, meetings and courtrooms; and to preserve the principles 
of free speech . . . .”193  On behalf of organizations such as Dow 
Jones & Company; Hearst Corporation; The New York Times; 
and Thomson Reuters Markets, LLC, the RCFP filed the 
equivalent of an amicus brief with the European Court of Justice 
in the proceedings for Google v. CNIL.194  This brief offers points 
of contention to the right to be forgotten and its implications 
concerning free speech. 
The specific argument of the organization is twofold; first, 
delisting on a search engine limits the effectiveness of the press 
worldwide; and second, different countries compare the 
importance of the right to be forgotten and the right of free 
speech in various ways.195  The implication of the first point is 
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that by allowing any public information to be removed from the 
internet around the world, including news articles, hinders the 
reach of media outlets.196  The RCFP states, “any single state’s 
attempt to limit worldwide access to public information 
represents an existential threat to journalistic freedom and the 
fundamental rights of the people to receive information through 
any media . . . .”197 
 
The second point emphasizes the fact that countries across 
the world have differing customs, and thus the enforcement of 
the right to be forgotten is not promulgated “in a vacuum.”198  
For example: it is a crime in Germany to deny the Holocaust; 
this restriction would not receive much opposition, but would 
most likely be incompatible with American free speech 
ideology.199  Furthermore, the U.S. ranks first among nations for 
free speech tolerance on the Free Expression Index at 5.73, as 
collected by the World Economic Forum.200  Other nations are 
ranked variably, including Germany at 18th overall, with a score 
of 4.34, and Japan at 30th overall, with a score of 3.27.201  In the 
midst of these differing viewpoints, the GDPR requires strict 
compliance and makes all other applicable laws subordinate, 
censoring the media outlets in countries that otherwise provide 
greater protection.202  Therefore, allowing the right to be 
forgotten to extend outside the EU would facilitate censorship of 
media outlets and restrict free access to information. While free 
press and free speech receive different treatment worldwide, 
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censoring media outlets hinders the spread of information, 
which if anything, provides an outlet for oppressed individuals.  
As UNESCO so aptly states, “[i]nformation is power.  Freedom 
of Information and Freedom of Expression work against the 
concentration of information within the hands of a few.”203 
C. Super-Intermediaries: A Road Block for Free Information 
As the use of social media surges, so do requests to delist 
information and disputes over data usage.204  In most situations, 
users of these sites publish information on their accounts, and 
when they want to remove that information, the company or 
data controller turns toward its own internal protocols to 
adjudicate the request.205  Although the CJEU has yet to issue a 
definitive ruling as to whether the right to be forgotten applies 
to social media platforms as hosts, it is important to consider the 
impact of potentially placing such obligations on them, as Google 
and other data controllers currently have.206  The GDPR 
reinforced this responsibility on the part of data controllers, 
tasking them with the immediate effectuation of the right to be 
forgotten.  For example, in Google Spain Google was ordered to 
remove Mr. González’s information.207 
 
Data controllers like Google are tasked with responding to 
requests for removal due to a variety of circumstances including 
harassment, hateful speech, and more.208  Thus, these 
companies become intermediaries—acting as adjudicator of 
disputes between data subjects and data controllers.209  Being 
that these intermediaries are controlling the influx of data on 
their site, they are implicitly tasked with adjudicating disputes 
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concerning individual rights and privacy interests.210  The rise 
of such entities as YouTube, Google, and Facebook have given 
way to a theory of “super-intermediaries,” promulgated by Ira 
Steven Natheson, which dictates that certain intermediaries 
have a high degree of involvement, legal scrutiny, and 
reputation, which creates immense power when adjudicating 
these disputes.211  The GDPR and the extension of the right to 
be forgotten across the world reaffirms the dangers of super-
intermediaries and further endangers free expression.212 
 
The power of the super-intermediaries to adjudicate data 
disputes can be a threat to the protection of privacy interests and 
other human rights concerns, as the super-intermediaries 
effectually stand in the shoes of courts.213  This is potentially 
dangerous as these companies lack checks for accuracy and 
transparency, as a court is usually required to comply with.214  
The super-intermediaries determine if a request is worthy of 
removal and the terms of use of that company usually dictate 
the guidelines for such, which the entity itself creates.215  As 
Rebecca MacKinnon notes, super-intermediaries’ regulation 
employees “play the roles of lawmakers, judge, jury, and police 
all at the same time.”216  Essentially, the companies become self-
regulating and use their own discretion subject to abuse; unlike 
courts which are subject to case precedent and state 
                                                          
210  See id. at 24–25 (discussing the nature of internet intermediaries’ 
power). 
211  See id. at 58–60 (discussing the amount of power super-intermediaries 
have). 
212  See Adam Satariano, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Privacy Rule Is Limited 
by Europe’s Top Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/technology/europe-google-right-to-be-
forgotten.html (discussing how opponents of the ruling said removing links 
would set a dangerous precedent and make it easier for information to be 
deleted from the internet). 
213  See Nathenson, supra note 152, at 156 (discussing the importance that 
super-intermediaries’ must strive for accuracy, i.e. the finding of facts, the 
articulation of legal principles, and the application of facts to those principles, 
in order to respect digital due process). 
214  See id. (noting Facebook’s governance system not being enforced 
consistently or uniformly). 
215  See id. at 156–60 (discussing the lack of transparency super-
intermediaries demonstrate when deciding which requests are worthy of 
removal). 
216  See id. at 156. 
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regulation.217  It should be noted that like a court, super-
intermediaries are subject to review via a lawsuit to enforce the 
right to be forgotten, but the cost of bringing such a suit against 
an organization with mass wealth and power can be difficult.218 
 
Initial disputes however become adjudicated solely in the 
hands of an employee, who will make the determination of 
whether data is removed, implicitly determining privacy 
interests on a daily basis.219  If discretion is abused, it is possible 
that these entities can fall short of a court of law in the 
effectuation of the right to be forgotten.  Furthermore, super-
intermediaries’ transparency is completely self-regulated.  The 
degree of transparency of disputes and company policy 
regarding data usage is in the companies’ discretion, casting 
doubt on the integrity of the actual policies.220  As Nathenson 
notes, a high degree of transparency should be assured, as it 
provides confidence in the competency of companies to protect 
privacy interests.221 
 
Adequate protection of free expression can be hindered if the 
right to be forgotten’s global reach continues.  Different 
countries have different standards of free expression, and as 
such, the right to be forgotten can require super-intermediaries 
to be in violation of a country’s local law where data would 
otherwise not be removed, or vice-versa.222  This can create 
inconsistencies in the effectuation of privacy in a country that is 
extremely friendly to free expression.  Nathenson provides a 
clear example with the “Innocence of Muslims” video that was 
posted to YouTube in 2012,223 and was not removed from the site 
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in the U.S. despite requests to do so.224  The video condemned 
Islam and mocked the prophet Muhammad, creating a great 
deal of controversy.225  However, YouTube refused to remove the 
video from their site, due to the video’s compliance with YouTube 
“hate speech policies.”226  Notwithstanding such compliance, the 
protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
regarding hate speech would have allowed the video to remain 
on the site upon a lawsuit.227  Thus, in this particular situation, 
a hateful video was allowed to remain on the internet where 
other countries, such as Egypt, had temporarily banned the 
video.228 
 
While it can be argued that the freedom of expression 
prevailed in this scenario, inconsistencies remain—the video 
was removed in Egypt, but was not removed in the U.S.229  The 
global reach of the right to be forgotten will exacerbate these 
inconsistencies and the power of super-intermediaries, such as 
YouTube, to adjudicate these disputes.  The danger that lies 
within the allowance of social media companies to determine 
privacy interests is real, and with the uncertainty of the global 
reach deriving from Google v. CNIL, the number of disputes that 
these companies will determine will only increase. 
IV. IDEOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM 
A. Data Imperialism 
A potential implication of the right to be forgotten is the 
assertion of EU jurisdiction onto other countries if the CJEU 
rules in favor of the CNIL in Google v. CNIL.230  This is the 
concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which Dan Svantesson 
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defines an act of such as “seek[ing] to control or otherwise 
directly affect the activities of an object (person, business, etc.) 
outside the territory of the state making the assertion.”231  Since 
the introduction of the Directive in 1995, the EU has become 
infamous for asserting its own privacy laws extraterritorially to 
protect its subjects in other sovereigns, in an effort to account 
for the wide reach of the internet.232 
 
The EU’s concerns have been that data controllers interact 
with EU citizens in other countries, which leaves such 
individuals subject to the data protection laws of that locale.233  
Under Article 3(2)(a) of the GDPR for example, social media sites 
that store information of “subjects residing in the [EU]” must be 
compliant with the right to be forgotten and the respective 
regulations under the GDPR.234  As Svantesson notes, “an EU 
resident providing personal information during a holiday in New 
York would be protected by the EU data protection Regulation 
by virtue of his EU residence.”235 
 
An act of such extraterritorial jurisdiction can be analogized 
to an imperialistic campaign by the EU in the name of data 
privacy.236  According to Merriam-Webster, imperialism is the 
“extension or imposition of power,” the imposition of which has 
historically caused wars, famine, and a loss of freedom.237  
Imperialistic campaigns often leave the passive nation with a 
loss of sovereign autonomy, with the aggressive nation asserting 
its own jurisdiction over that passive nation.238  In a modern 
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context, imperialism has been used to identify the acts of the 
U.S. in other countries to promote its own domestic interests, 
such as extending extraterritorial jurisdiction over commercial 
activity without American borders.239  This type of imperialism 
stands in direct conflict with the theory of sovereignty, a 
principle of international law which dictates that nations have 
ultimate authority to govern those within their borders.240 
 
The specific imposition of power to solidify data privacy has 
been named “data imperialism”241 which can cause two major 
negative effects.  First, a potential conflict of law between the 
two nations may arise, undermining the integrity of the host 
nation by violating sovereignty and poor diplomatic relations.242  
Second, in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, the EU 
imparts the same restrictions on free expression under the right 
to be forgotten onto citizens of other nations.243 
 
One important example of such data imperialism is 
demonstrated by the issuance of fines to data controllers who fail 
to comport with the right to be forgotten.244  When a fine is 
issued, there is a great chance that in order to minimize any 
financial implications, the data controller will cede to the EU’s 
regulations, thereby rendering any other nation’s regulations to 
the contrary moot.245  While this implication is not as easily 
identifiable, in essence, it is the equivalent of coercive and 
forcible compliance with EU law.246 
 
Furthermore, as the right to be forgotten is given validity to 
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be asserted in other nations pursuant to Google v. CNIL, the EU 
has successfully launched an imperialistic campaign asserting 
its own ideologies on other nations as an act that will worsen 
diplomatic relations abroad and weaken freedom of expression 
across the world.247 
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Conflict of Laws 
CNIL’s argument in Google Spain was that the only method 
to adequately enforce the right to be forgotten was to allow its 
application in other countries where data is found and requested 
to be deleted by EU citizens;248 by doing so, it exerts the EU’s 
ideology of the paramount importance of protecting subjects 
from exploitation on the internet.249  While it cannot be said that 
this ideology is necessarily based on anything but consideration 
for human rights, the application of such limits free expression 
and a free press as stated above.250  Additionally, other countries 
may not have anything akin to the right to be forgotten, or they 
might apply a similar right in different manners, such as giving 
more deference to the companies that process data.251  Thus, the 
effect of extraterritorial jurisdiction as conflicting with laws of 
other nations can create an unreasonable interference with the 
law of that nation that only benefits the nation which is seeking 
to impose its law on others.252 
 
A paradigm of the conflicting viewpoints is the American 
view of privacy in relation to free speech and free press.  Under 
the First Amendment, free speech and free press are enshrined 
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in the U.S. Constitution.253  While U.S. law recognizes privacy 
interests in so-called private information that has not yet been 
made public, it also protects information that has been made 
public while the right to be forgotten, in application, does not.254  
Public information is protected under the First Amendment, as 
free access to information was a major motivation of the drafters 
of the U.S. Constitution.255  As Professor Dawinder Sidhu 
observed in a 2014 U.S. News and World Report article: 
 
[t]he vision of a marketplace of ideas illustrates why [American] 
society places a premium on free speech. As part of our DNA, we 
believe that, in the marketplace of ideas, the value or truth of 
information will spring forth from the open consideration of 
competing opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives. The availability 
and discussion of that information, when relevant to policy and 
policymakers, can enrich and enhance our capacity for self-
governance.256 
 
Such is the justification for the fact that publication of 
criminal history is disallowed in America, which is contrasted 
with the ruling in Google Spain, in which González was granted 
the ability to remove information regarding a bankruptcy 
proceeding.257  Thus, privacy law in America is seen to have 
significant weighing checks, such as free speech and free access 
to information, which conflicts with the promulgation of EU 
privacy law. 
 
America is not alone. The newly instituted GDPR recognizes 
and accounts for the many differing views on free speech and 
privacy from various countries.258 The new GDPR requires the 
assurance of data protection in transfers made to countries that 
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are not ratified for their privacy laws by the EU.259 The 
regulation in the GDPR only applies to transfers made within 
the EU,260 which is an example of a privacy regulation that 
adequately ensures data privacy without acting in an 
extraterritorial manner.  However, the EU nonetheless asserts 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over American citizens or other 
nations when the GDPR directly conflicts with the law and 
ideology of that nation and the provisions of same are required 
to be enforced.261  This point is not made to ratify the conduct of 
a country who has little to no privacy regulation, but rather to 
illustrate that countries regulate privacy laws differently in 
relation to other fundamental rights.  In such a situation, 
international conflicts can emanate from jurisdictional 
concerns.262 
 
With different countries asserting jurisdiction in foreign 
territories, antitrust law has become an area of law generating 
great conflict.263  Conflicts in this area derive from the contacts 
that certain commercial entities have within a particular 
country.264  Likewise, potential conflicts can emanate asserting 
jurisdiction over an American company in America storing an 
EU citizen’s data.265  Other conflicts such as trade disputes and 
jurisdictional treaties are evidence of the potential presence of 
territorial conflicts in the area of data privacy enforcement.266 
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C. Data Imperialism’s Impacts on Freedoms Globally: An 
Outlook 
If the EU is vindicated in Google v. CNIL, the 
extraterritorial jurisdictional provisions of the GDPR could 
necessitate the introduction of an international treaty or 
agreement which provides consensual jurisdiction in other 
countries to avoid potential conflict.  Regardless, a potential 
effect of extending the reach of the right to be forgotten is the 
limitation on free expression.267  By enforcing the right to be 
forgotten abroad in other countries, the EU’s premium on the 
right to remove information in furtherance of privacy interests 
over free expression could have a chilling effect on free speech—
via removal of public information and monetary fines for 
violations of the GDPR.268 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is much left unanswered in the wake of Google v. 
CNIL as to the legal basis or existence of a global application of 
the right to be forgotten.269  As it stands now, a global application 
of the right to be forgotten will significantly limit free 
expression, including free access to information, free speech and 
free press.270  Such a dereliction of free expression can negatively 
impact the spread of knowledge and betterment of the world.271  
Furthermore, the right to be forgotten allows Google and other 
data controllers to become adjudicators of free expression, which 
threatens the integrity and protection of such right.272  In 
allowing the right to be forgotten to exist as it does, or expand 
such to exist beyond the territory of the EU, the EU is allowed 
to engage in global data imperialism under the cloak of goodwill 
and the common good.273  This imperialistic campaign can work 
to worsen diplomatic relations and act as a vehicle to hinder free 
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expression abroad.274  It is imperative, therefore, that the 
negative effects of the right to be forgotten are not, in essence, 
forgotten. 
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